Brian Knight, da Brown University, vai apresentar o seu trabalho de investigação. 

Policing for profit? Evidence from post-Ferguson reforms in Missouri

In the United States, fines and fees from policing can be a major source of government revenue. Critics argue this incentivizes law-enforcement to maximize collections rather than safety. We investigate this issue in the context of a series of reforms in Missouri designed to curb policing for profit after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson. In the time series, we document large aggregate declines in per-capita collections and traffic stops immediately after the shooting. The aggregate decline is concentrated in municipalities raising significant revenue from collections at baseline and in locations with the motive and opportunity to engage in policing for profit. Examining specific reforms, we find that a 20 percent cap on revenue from policing introduced after Ferguson can explain as much as half of the aggregate decline. Taken together, our findings highlight both how revenue motives can distort the criminal justice system, and how simple reforms that realign real-world incentives can change police behavior.