20 Jun '25
Finance Seminars | Friday Deepak Hegde, NYU

Deepak Hegde, from NYU, will present his research. 

Patent Signaling

Patent policy assumes disclosure facilitates imitation. Yet inventors often disclose even when legal protections are weak. We develop a model where, by disclosing earlier, a firm signals a greater commercialization efficiency and thereby deters entry of imitators. Using the American Inventors’ Protection Act of 1999, which allowed accelerated patent disclosures, we show: (i) inventors disclose higher-quality inventions sooner; and (ii) disclosure is faster in fields where rivals learn slowly. Event-study estimates reveal that up to 50 percent of stock-market returns linked to patenting reflect informational gains from disclosure, not legal rights.

Deepak Hegde, NYU
  • From 20 June 2025 11:00 AM
  • To 20 June 2025 12:30 PM
  • Location B002