Apostolos Filippas, from Fordham Gabelli School of Business, will present his research work. 

Title: Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Abstract: Buyers pursuing unavailable sellers is a common source of inefficiency in matching markets. We report the results of a field experiment in a large online labor market where workers could pay to signal higher capacity via a badge that simply said “available now." All workers could rent this signal, but only randomly treated employers could see it. We find that workers who rented this signal were positively selected, treated employers sought them out more, and matching efficiency increased. We show empirically that mere statements about worker capacity had become uninformative in this marketplace, and we develop a dynamic matching model that explains why costly signaling is necessary to faciltate this coordination. Two years after the experiment, we show that workers renting this signal continue receiving substantially higher employer attention.